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1. Hegel’s Defense of Capitalist Market Systems
The system of needs is Hegel’s term for the modern capitalist 
economy, a system of generalized commodity production and exchange.2 
A person generally wants to own a particular commodity because its 
particular concrete (qualitative, heterogeneous) properties enable it to 
address a particular concrete (qualitative, heterogenous) need.3 There 
may be other needs the same object can address as well. Or other things 
may be able to address the same need. Such considerations led Hegel to 
assert that a higher‑order universal concept, need in general, is implicit 
whenever particular needs are addressed by particular things. Similarly, 
we can consider the general usefulness of an object, that is, its ability to 
address need in general to some extent or other. Hegel terms this abstract 
(quantitative, homogeneous) property the value of the object:
A thing in use is an individual thing … related to a specific need. … 
(T)he specific need which it satisfies is at the same time need in general 
1  tonys@iastate.edu The author would like to thank Dan Krier, Geert Reuten, and the 
Organizing Committee of the Lisbon Hegel/Marx conference for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this article.
2  Hegel argues that a well‑functioning market society requires the administration of 
justice, an impartial judicial system with coercive powers capable of effectively enforcing 
property and contract rights. Its effective operation will be assumed here. 
3  Throughout the paper “needs” is to be taken in Hegel’s very broad sense, including the 
“wants” often contrasted to the “basic needs” of biological organisms.
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and thus is comparable … with other needs, while the thing in virtue of 
the same considerations is comparable with things meeting other needs. 
This, the thing’s universality … abstracted from the thing’s specific 
quality, is the thing’s value (Hegel 2008, pp. 74‑5/§63).
This value is then expressed in abstract (quantitative, homogenous) 
units of money:
(I)f you want to express the value of a thing not in its specificity but in the 
abstract, then it is money which expresses this. … Money, as something 
abstract, merely expresses this value (Ibid., p. 75/§63 Addition).
The category system of needs captures Hegel’s view of the capitalist 
economy perfectly. From his standpoint the paradigmatic sequence of 
economic actions begins with someone owning a particular commodity (C1) 
not needed much, if at all. If it is sold at its value the money (M) obtained 
can then be used to purchase a different commodity (C2) with the same 
value but different particular properties that enable the particular needs of 
the buyer to be addressed to a greater degree than was the case before the 
exchanges.4 Both commodities and money are thereby essentially means 
to address human needs. 
Of course, in the endless series of exchanges…C-M-C-M-C-M-C-M-
C-M-C… it is as easy to discern a M‑C‑M pattern as C‑M‑C sequences. 
M‑C‑M’’ circuits are more to the point; no one would dispute that many 
economic agents in capitalism are profit-driven, aiming at a monetary 
return (M’) exceeding their investments (M). In Hegel’s account, however, 
money is only ever a proximate goal, sought today so that goods and 
services addressing needs can be purchased tomorrow.
For Hegel, this system of needs is a realm of freedom. In contrast to 
social formations based on slavery, serfdom, forced tribute, or bureaucratic 
commands, individuals are free to pursue their own particular conceptions 
of the good, so long as those conceptions do not involve infringing the 
rights of others to do the same. Freedom of consumer choice and freedom 
of occupation are two important corollaries. Further, the spur market 
societies give to the development of new needs and new capabilities frees 
their members from both the limits of “natural” biological needs and 
constraints imposed by traditional social practices. 
4  The fact that some commodities – raw materials, tools, etc. – contribute to addressing 
human needs indirectly complicates the picture without changing anything essential.
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Hegel also argues that the system of needs institutionalizes an 
unprecedented general level of material well‑being. Most economic agents 
do not intend their actions to further the general good. But as Adam Smith 
famously put it, the logic of market competition operates as an “invisible 
hand,” ensuring that the aggregate good of society is furthered behind their 
backs. Individuals’ private self‑interest in market success is most likely to 
be fulfilled when their economic activity contributes to the production and 
distribution of commodities that help others address their needs. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, Marx agreed with much of this. Throughout his 
life Marx vehemently dismissed attempts to romanticize pre‑capitalist 
societies. He recognized that the freedom granted in modern market 
societies (in principle, if hardly always in practice) was an advance over 
slavery and serfdom (Marx 1986a, p. 213). And he granted that no other 
mode of production has brought greater productivity advances or higher 
general living standards than capitalism. Of course, for Marx this is only 
one side of the story. The same, however, can be said of Hegel. 
No less than Marx, Hegel explicitly notes systematic tendencies 
to market failure with respect to the provision of public goods, and the 
safety of food and other products. Hegel too saw that the “invisible hand” 
does not prevent involuntary unemployment, severe inequality, extreme 
poverty, and pervasive economic insecurity. He noted how market 
societies are beset by a systematic tendency to produce more goods and 
services than markets can absorb (“overproduction”), with the resulting 
bankruptcies imposing great hardship on workers and their communities 
(Hegel 2008, p. 222/§245). The same harms occur when imports capture 
domestic markets. Hegel’s critique goes deeper still when he emphasizes 
how market imperatives are imposed on individual agents with external 
necessity. Individuals cannot be “at home” in a world governed by the alien 
power of market forces, even if those forces are nothing but the aggregate 
results of their own free choices (Ibid., p. 184/§186). 
At this point, however, Hegel and Marx take different paths. In Hegel’s 
methodological framework the systematic shortcomings of one level of 
determinations provide justification for a transition to a higher level. In 
the case at hand, the critical shortcomings of the system of needs establish 
the systematic necessity of moving to higher‑order determinations of the 
rational modern polity, including 
* A Public Authority (“Police”) charged with providing public 
goods and regulating businesses in the public interest); 
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* Voluntary and Municipal associations in civil society 
(“Corporations”) insuring members against sickness, old age, 
and involuntary unemployment, provide retraining for displaced 
workers, and so on. 
* Government agencies on local, regional, and national levels 
actively supporting economic development, nurturing industries 
with advantages in the world market and emerging sectors capable 
of replacing those in decline.
* State agencies effectively implementing social welfare programs 
providing a safety net for those in the direst circumstances.
Most importantly of all, The Philosophy of Right culminates with a 
constitutional republic, including 
* An extensive public sphere engaged in on‑going discussion of 
matters of public concern.
* Legislative bodies with representatives from all significant social 
groups, accountable to those they represent and capable of coming 
to agreement on laws warranting rational assent. 
* An administrative apparatus with relevant expertise to implement 
laws and institute supplementary regulations when necessary.
* A top state official with responsibility for oversight of domestic 
programs and foreign policy (while itself subject to effective 
oversight by the legislature and citizenry). 
A strong argument can be made that the rational state forms the polity as 
a whole into a “concrete universal,” mediating individuality, particularity, 
and universality together in a rational dynamic system:
(I)n the practical sphere the state is a system of three syllogisms. (1) The 
Individual or person, through his particularity or physical or mental needs 
(which when carried out to their full development give civil society), is 
coupled with the universal, i.e. with society, law, right, government. (2) The 
will or action of the individuals is the intermediating force which procures 
for these needs satisfaction in society, in law, etc., and which gives to society, 
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law, etc., their fulfillment and actualization. (3) But the universal, that is to 
say the state, government, and law, is the permanent underlying mean in 
which the individuals and their satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled 
reality, intermediation, and persistence (Hegel 1975, pp. 264‑5/§198; see 
Vieweg 2012). 
Assertions regarding the whole can only be legitimately made on 
the level of the whole. From a Hegelian perspective, however, Marx’s 
criticisms of modern society as a whole apply at most to the economy 
taken in abstraction from the whole. A Hegelian would say that Marx 
failed to recognize that the higher‑order political framework of the state is 
capable in principle of putting the most pernicious tendencies in markets 
out of play. 
This is not how Marx would formulate the dispute.
2. Marx’s Concepts of Value and Capital
For Hegel, a useful thing has both concrete properties enabling it to 
meet concrete human needs and an abstract property, value, its general 
utility in meeting needs in general. In every human society that has ever 
existed, particular things have been used to address particular needs. If 
general utility and need in general are implicit in the relationship of using 
things, “value” would be an objective property of things in any and all 
societies. This transhistorical concept of value does not contribute to the 
goal Hegel and Marx shared of comprehending our time in thought. 
If we want a concept of value specific to modern capitalism, we must 
begin with historically specific features of its essential social relations. 
When products take the social form of commodities produced for sale, 
they come with the risk of not being sold. If other producers seize the 
market, or buyers cannot be found, the production has been socially 
wasted. Producers in previous societies generally did not have to worry 
about this. They knew ex ante that if food were grown, it would be eaten; 
if clothes were sown, they would be worn. But in generalized commodity 
production producers are separated both from each other and from the 
ultimate users of their products. Sociality here takes the historically 
specific form of dissociated sociality. 
If the social relationships among producers and users cannot be not 
guaranteed ex ante, they must be established ex post. The social validation 
of privately undertaken production occurs when products are sold for 
money. Only then do they objectively possess social value. “Value” in this 
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sense is an abstract (quantitative, homogenous) property (“produced by a 
certain amount of socially validated private labor”).5 But unlike Hegel’s 
concept of value, this concept is a real abstraction, brought about by an 
actual social process specific to modern capitalism.
Marx agrees with Hegel that value is essentially connected to needs. (In 
his terminology, a commodity cannot have value if it lacks use value.) The 
essential matter, however, is that when social relationships are in the form 
of dissociated sociality, these relationships necessarily appear in the form 
of properties of things (the values of commodities, represented in money). 
Marx refers to this as the “fetish character” of commodities and money. 
For Marx, the modern capitalist economy is more a system of fetishism 
than a system of needs. When Marx writes in one of the Grundrisse’s most 
striking formulations that each individual “carries his social power, as 
also his connection with society, in his pocket,” we are meant to take this 
statement literally (Marx 1986a, p. 94).
For Hegel, commodities and money are essentially means to further 
human ends, even if money can be a proximate end of economic activity. 
For Marx, in contrast, when human sociality takes the form of dissociated 
sociality means and ends become inverted. This is indisputably the case for 
units of production and distribution:
* The sale of commodities for money is the only way privately 
undertaken production can be socially validated. Units of 
production and distribution must make sale for money the 
overriding end of their endeavors in any given period or lose their 
investment. 
* This compulsion in reinforced when we consider the competitive 
pressures facing units of production and distribution over time. If 
they hope to survive, they must obtain monetary resources in a 
given period if they are to purchase the commodity inputs required 
in the next period. 
* These units must in fact strive to obtain monetary returns 
exceeding initial investment. If they begin a new cycle with 
a significant lower amount of investment funds than their 
competitors, they would necessarily tend to be in a disadvantageous 
position. Competitors would be better able to expand production, 
5  Since the money in which this value is expressed can in the proper amounts be used 
to purchase any commodity, “value” can also be defined as the abstract property 
“generalized exchangeability.”
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invest in more advanced productive inputs, increase marketing 
expenditures, develop promising new product lines, respond to 
new market opportunities, meet unexpected market fluctuations, 
retain old investors, attract new ones, and so on. 
It follows that units of production and distribution that do not 
systematically direct their endeavors to the appropriation of monetary 
returns (M′) exceeding initial investment (M), tend to be pushed to the 
margins of social life, when not forced out of existence altogether. They 
must therefore systematically subordinate other ends to the pursuit of 
monetary returns. Marx’s conclusion regarding units of production 
and distribution in generalized commodity production is unequivocal: 
“Use‑values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim … nor 
must the profit on any single transaction. [The] aim is rather the unceasing 
movement of profit-making” (Marx 1976, p. 254).
What of the social agents who consume commodities because of their 
use‑value in addressing their needs? Here too need satisfaction is hardly 
the whole story.
* The goods and services required to address human needs 
generally take the form of commodities owned by others who 
demand money for them. Where does this money come from? 
In general, individuals must acquire it through association with 
units of production or distribution whose “aim is … the unceasing 
movement of profit-making.” Whatever form this takes – working 
for a wage or salary, owing stocks and bonds, being a member of 
a household where those forms of income are shared – the ability 
of social agents to meet their human needs generally depends on 
whether the units of production and distribution with which they 
are associated attain the inhuman end of a M’ exceeding M. In this 
sense the latter has objective priority over the former. 
* Human needs addressed within generalized commodity 
production and exchange are systematically restricted to those that 
can be addressed by goods or services in the form of commodities. 
This is a subset of all needs. Further, only those needs that have 
sufficient purchasing power (“effective demand”) behind them are 
addressed. The needs relevant to the so‑called system of needs are 
therefore limited to a subset of a subset of needs. The valorization 
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imperative (“M must become M’!”) imposes this restriction, 
further evidence of its objective priority. 
* When individual agents purchase goods and services for 
consumption, their subjective intention is simply to address their 
needs. But the objective social meaning of their actions goes beyond 
that intention. Their purchases socially validate the privately 
undertaken endeavors of units of production and distribution. In 
other words, the culminating M‑C phase of a C‑M‑C sequence is 
incorporated within a M‑C‑M’circuit, contributing to its culminating 
moment, C‑M’. 
* After a purchase for the sake of consumption has been completed, 
agents whose needs have been addressed now have fewer monetary 
resources. In a world where money is generally required to gain 
access to the means to satisfy needs, their funds must eventually 
be replenished. And that process, once again, presupposes renewed 
association with circuits that have money as their endpoint. 
* Finally, if we consider C‑M‑C and M‑C‑M’ sequences together 
an important asymmetry is manifest. A given C‑M‑C series ends 
with the consumption of a product; a successful M-C-M’ sequence 
does not end. It is reproduced and expands over time; the M’ that 
is the culmination of one sequence serves in whole or in part as the 
M of a subsequent sequence. In social reproduction as a totality, 
then, C‑M‑C exchanges lack the substantiality of M‑C‑M’circuits. 
To speak of a M‑C‑M’ circuit reproducing and expanding over time 
is to say that value maintains its identity as it proceeds from the form of 
money to that of commodities and back again: 
[B]oth the money and the commodity function only as different modes 
of existence of value itself … [Value] is constantly changing from one 
form into the other, without becoming lost in this movement; it thus 
becomes transformed into an automatic subject … [V]alue is here 
the subject of a process … (T)he movement in the course of which it 
adds surplus‑value is its own movement, its valorisation is therefore 
self‑valorisation… [V]alue suddenly presents itself as a self‑moving 
substance which passes through a process of its own, and for which 
commodities and money are both mere forms (Ibid., pp. 255‑6).
19Marx’s Hegelian Critique of Hegel
“Capital” is Marx’s term for this value in process. Taking into account 
phases of the process left implicit to this point, capital first takes on the 
form of investment capital (M) used to purchase inputs into production 
(commodity capital C), followed by the phase of capital in production (P), 
which results in commodity outputs (C′, inventory capital) that are then 
sold for a monetary amount exceeding the initial investment (M′, realized 
capital). 
Marx’s concept of capital, no less than Hegel’s system of needs, concerns 
production and distribution as a system. All the interacting circuits of 
capital together form a macro‑monetary circuit on the level of the society 
as a whole, beginning with the aggregate amount of money capital initially 
invested in the society in a given period, progressing through the aggregate 
production and circulation of commodities in that period, and finally 
culminating with the aggregate returns from sale of these commodities.
Marx’s concept of capital as a macro‑monetary totality is a profoundly 
original contribution to social ontology. “Capital” is missing in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right. That is like Hamlet without the Prince. To categorize 
the modern market economy as a system of needs is to miscategorize it; it is 
essentially a system of capital. Its ultimate purpose is not the satisfaction of 
human needs, but the furthering of capital’s insatiable need for valorization, 
the transformation of M into M’. Its ultimate good is not a human good, but 
capital’s good. The alienation here goes far beyond individuals’ external 
relationship to the aggregate consequences of their individual choices, as 
Marx’s discussion of the capital/wage labor relationship makes clear.
3. The Capital/Wage Labor Relation 
For Hegel (and many others) the wage labor contract is in principle a 
free agreement among equally free agents. In this case, however, one party 
does not simply agree to give up a thing to another in return for some other 
thing. One person agrees to put the use of his or her human capabilities at 
the disposal of another. Since for Hegel persons are nothing more than their 
actions and the reverberations of those actions in history, this might seem 
to be in tension with a fundamental principle of abstract right: persons 
can exchange things, but are not themselves objects to be exchanged. The 
freedom of persons to exchange objects does not extend to a freedom 
to sell ourselves into slavery.6 To alleviate this worry, Hegel asserts that 
6  “By alienating the whole of my time, as crystallized in my work, and everything I 
produced, I would be making into another’s property the substance of my being, my 
universal activity, my personality” (Hegel 2008, pp. 78‑9/§67). 
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having property in a thing implies the right to full use of that thing (Hegel 
2008, p. 73/§62). In the wage contract the activities of the laborer are put at 
the disposal of the employer for a limited period of time. Since full use is 
absent, the wage laborer retains the status of an autonomous person (Ibid., 
pp. 78‑9/§67). 
This argument must be considered as one of the weakest in the 
Hegelian corpus. For one thing, the time wage laborers are subject to 
capital is still substantial enough to be a matter of normative concern.7 
Other difficulties will become apparent after considering Marx’s claim 
that the systematic reproduction of the macro-monetary circuit of capital 
(M‑C‑P‑C′‑M′) is simultaneously a systematic reproduction of the capital/
wage labor relationship.
In capitalist market societies a relatively small group owns and controls 
a critical mass of investment capital (M), enabling them to purchase the 
commodity inputs required for production and distribution (C). Some 
of these commodities are means of production (raw materials, tools and 
machinery, and so on), purchased from some units of capital by other 
units. Of more relevance here is the purchase of a quite different sort of 
commodity. Those who do not have a critical mass of monetary holdings 
are “dissociated” from the objective material preconditions of human 
life. Means of human subsistence, and the means of production necessary 
to produce those means of subsistence, both take the social form of 
commodities owned by others. Non‑owners must somehow obtain money 
to gain access to the goods and services they and their dependents need. 
This means in effect that they must sell their labor power as a commodity 
to those who own and control investment capital. Their living labor is then 
set to work in a production process (P), resulting in a set of commodity 
outputs (C’). If all goes well these commodities can then be sold profitably 
for some monetary return (M’) exceeding initial investment. 
The aggregate commodity outputs include wage goods. After wages 
7  Consider a wage laborer who spends 9 hours at a workplace, 2 hours in transit to and from 
the workplace, an hour preparing for the workday, another recovering from it physically 
and psychologically, a further 3 hours engaged in tasks required for the labor of this 
person and any dependents to be available for hire in the future (shopping, cooking, 
eating, cleaning, etc.), and sleeping 8 hours. That would be all 24 hours in the day of 
one’s person’s life directly connected to employment as a means for others’ gain. If this 
person were to carve out a little time of their own, how much of a substantive difference 
would that really make? I note in passing that capital’s colonization of leisure time is one 
of the distinguishing features of contemporary capitalism, whether through commodified 
spectacles or through the commodification and monetarization of information we reveal 
about ourselves in activities outside the workplace. 
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have been spent on purchasing them (with perhaps a small amount 
set aside for savings), workers find themselves at the start of the next 
macro‑monetary circuit, once more without extensive monetary reserves. 
They must therefore once again sell their labor power as a commodity to 
those who own and control investment capital. The owners and controllers 
of capital, in contrast, have as a group (if not in each case) obtained a 
monetary return enabling them to reinvest in the following circuit, even 
after (typically extensive) funds have been deducted for their personal 
consumption. From the standpoint of both wage labor and capital, then, the 
process of capital’s valorization is simultaneously a process reproducing 
the capital/wage labor relation.
In Marx’s account three essential features of this process are of special 
significance. 
1. In generalized commodity production and exchange wage laborers 
are free to seek employment from whomever they wish. In principle, at 
least, no direct personal coercion underlies labor contracts. But coercion 
can be indirect and impersonal. In a monetized economy, those lacking 
sufficient money capital are generally forced to sell their labor power to 
some unit of capital or other. This is a structural coercion, due to the social 
forms in place, rather than the natural conditions of human life.
2. Whenever labor processes involve extensive social cooperation, 
there will be a need for decisions to be made regarding who is to do 
what, when they are to do it, and with whom it is to be done. In capitalist 
market societies, the social power to make these decisions ultimately lies 
with owners/investors and the managers they appoint to represent their 
interests. Those exercising this authority in workplace communities are not 
accountable to those over whom the authority is exercised. This is a form 
of social domination. 
3. All societies in human history must produce social wealth and a 
social surplus, that is, goods and services exceeding what producers use 
to reproduce themselves over time. In capitalist market societies the social 
surplus takes the historically specific form of surplus value, the difference 
between M’ and M. Wage laborers will be hired if and only if the owners 
and controllers of capital foresee that at the completion of the capital 
circuit surplus value will have been produced that investors are able to 
appropriate and allocate as their private property. The wage laborers who 
collectively produced this surplus (with the aid of machinery and other 
goods previously produced by other wage laborers, the gifts of nature, the 
collective knowledge of the commons, and so on) have no more control 
over its allocation than slaves or serfs had over the social surplus they 
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produced for their masters and lords. In this crucial sense of the term wage 
laborers are exploited. “Capital … valorises itself through the appropriation 
of alien labour” (Marx 1986a, p. 233). 
The Hegelian category Schein refers to appearances that are at once 
necessary manifestations of essential matters and illusionary distortions 
of them. Hegel uses the term to refer to the illusion of individual agents in 
market societies that their well‑being depends on their own free actions, 
blind to the way their freedom and well‑being presupposes the entire 
institutional framework of the modern polity (Hegel 2008, p. 180/§181 
Addition). For Marx, Schein is indeed an appropriate category here. But 
for him the illusions are much deeper than Hegel recognized. It is mere 
Schein when this system appears to essentially be about human needs, 
rather than capital’s valorization. And the surface appearance of a system 
of free transactions among formally equal individuals occludes the heart 
of the matter: the systematic reproduction of a relationship essentially 
involving structural coercion, social domination, and social exploitation:
It is [not] a mere accident that capitalist and worker confront each other 
in the market as buyer and seller. It is the alternating rhythm of the 
process itself which throws the worker back onto the market again and 
again as a seller of his labour‑power and continually transforms his own 
product into a means by which another can purchase him. In reality, the 
worker belongs to capital before he has sold himself to the capitalist. 
His economic bondage is at once mediated through, and concealed by, 
the periodic renewal of the act by which he sells himself, his change 
of masters, and the oscillations in the market‑price of his labour (Marx 
1976, p. 724).
Marx conclusion echoes Hegel’s assessment of slavery’s historical 
limits:
The recognition of the product as its [the laborer’s] own, and its awareness 
that its separation from the conditions of its realisation is an injustice 
– a relationship imposed by force – is an enormous consciousness, itself 
the product of the capitalist mode of production and just as much the 
knell to its doom as the consciousness of the slave that he could not 
be the property of another reduced slavery to an artificial, lingering 
existence, and made it impossible for it to continue to provide the basis 
of production (Marx 1986a, pp. 390‑1). 
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Hegelians reject this conclusion, arguing that Marx’s “economism” 
prevented him from recognizing how problems in the capitalist economy 
can be addressed by higher‑order institutions, especially the state. A 
Marxian response to this charge follows. 
4. Marx on the Political
The three volumes of Capital represent only the first “Book” in the 
system of essential determinations of the capitalism projected by Marx 
(Ibid., p. 45; Smith 1990, pp. 200‑5). His call for a separate “Book on 
the State” shows that he recognized that comprehending the state requires 
more complex and concrete determinations than those considered in 
Capital. We should also recall that in Marx’s historical writings, political 
essays, and journalist reports he regularly stressed the causal role state 
officials have played in capitalism’s development. And in Capital itself 
Marx wrote at length about an ultimately successful struggle for reform 
legislation limiting the length of the working day. 
This leads to an obvious question. If Hegel says that the state is capable 
of independent action and of instituting reforms checking pernicious 
tendencies in the capitalist economy, how could Marx disagree, when he 
himself showed that the state is no mere epiphenomenon and he himself 
devoted so many pages of his masterwork to a successful reform? The 
answer lies with the historically specific form of “the political” in modern 
capitalist societies.
In pre‑capitalist class societies the political nature of the dominant 
social relations was reasonably transparent. On the one side there were 
slave owners; on the other slaves, producing a surplus appropriated by 
masters, or serfs producing a social surplus appropriated by lords. In yet 
other contexts warrior elites demanded tribute from independent peasant 
households. In all these cases, appropriating the social surplus was an 
essential part of political domination. In pre‑capitalist societies there was 
no distinct “economic” sphere separate from a “political” realm. 
In capitalist market societies matters appear quite different. The 
production and distribution of goods and services is mediated by the 
formally free decisions of individual persons to exchange commodities 
and money. State officials provide the background conditions for these 
choices (minimal for classical liberals; extensive for Hegel) and then step 
aside. Within this framework the obvious separation of “economic” and 
“political” spheres appears obvious. 
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Marx insists that this appearance is illusionary. Once the social relations 
of dissociated sociality are in place – the separation of producers from each 
other and from buyers, and the separation of individuals from the material 
preconditions of human existence – then the political community as a whole 
will be subjected to the valorization imperative and structured by a division 
between a surplus producing class and a surplus appropriating class. These are 
inherently political matters. To consider them as simply results of individual 
free choices is to be lost in Schein. Far from being guilty of “economism,” 
Marx is the great theorist of the extension of political considerations to their 
proper full scope. Capitalist society – and Hegel’s systematic reconstruction 
of its essential determinations – rests on the fundamental category mistake 
of depoliticizing what is inherently political. 
The other side of the coin of the depoliticization of “the economic” is the 
impoverishment of what is categorized as “political” in modern capitalism. 
The most fundamental questions of political life – What is the ultimate 
goal of our society? What sort of social relationships should structure 
the political community? – are treated as if they have not already been 
substantially answered by the valorization imperative and the reproduction 
of the capital/wage labor relation, respectively. 
Markets can and must be effectively regulated by the state. But political 
reforms addressing the pernicious structural tendencies of the capitalist 
economy must always be partial and precarious, due to its depolitization 
of inherently political matters, and the corresponding impoverishment of 
politics (Smith 2017). The important question here is whether these limits 
rule out the concrete universality Hegel claims for the modern state in the 
passage quoted at the conclusion of section 1. A number of considerations 
justify concluding that this is indeed the case.
The Illusory Promise of “Civic Republicanism” 
Leading Hegelian scholars rightly assert that Hegel was committed to a 
strong form of “civic republicanism” (Westphal 2018). But,
* No political system leaving untouched the subordination of one 
class to another in the production of a social surplus can adequately 
institutionalize such an order. Those controlling a critical mass of 
capital exercise an authority in workplace communities, and over 
the allocation of the social surplus in the polity as a whole, that is 
not subject to the consent of those over whom it is exerted. 
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* No political system leaving the allocation of the social surplus 
produced in the society as a whole to the private decisions of a 
relative handful of powerful citizens can adequately institutionalize 
strong civic republicanism. 
* No political system incorporating class inequality can 
institutionalize the substantial equality of political citizenship 
demanded by strong civic republicanism. The direct funding of 
political candidates, the ownership of media used to transmit political 
messages, the support of think tanks promulgating favored ideas, are 
only the most overt weapons granting those owning and controlling 
critical masses of capital wildly disproportionate political weight. 
Control of investment funds is itself a powerful political weapon. 
If a constitutional republic were to institute policies threatening to 
significantly shift the balance of power between labor and capital in 
the former’s favor, a capital strike would be inaugurated, plunging 
the economy into chaos. Faced with a refusal to invest, state 
officials would then face a stark choice: either rescind the reforms 
unacceptable to the representatives of capital or inaugurate a break 
from the property relations granting their private interests a de facto 
veto over public policy. Either option undermines the Hegelian 
claim that the polity of a capitalist market society can attain a true 
“concrete universality” harmoniously uniting universal law and 
government, the satisfaction of the particular needs of society, and 
the flourishing of individuals. 
The Limitations of Environmental Politics
All systems of producing and distributing goods and services use 
natural resources and generate wastes. But capitalism’s unrelenting “Grow 
or die!” imperative accelerates these processes into hyperdrive. Capitalist 
firms must attempt to appropriate as much profit as possible as fast as 
possible by producing, transporting, and selling as many commodities 
as possible, as fast as possible. This hyper‑accelerated temporality 
inevitably comes into tension with the temporality of replenishing natural 
resources and processing wastes. Natural resources tend to be extracted at 
a much faster rate than ecosystems can replenish them, and wastes tend 
to be generated at a much faster rate than ecosystems can absorb them. 
Eventually, a tipping point will be reached past which the degeneration of 
natural conditions exceeds the planetary boundaries within which human 
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history has unfolded (Marx 1976, p. 638). This catastrophe can be avoided 
only if the valorization imperative is dismantled. That is beyond the remit 
of any political order committed to maintaining a capitalist market society.
The Competitive State vs. The Social State
The state form Hegel advocates is actually a combination of two 
distinguishable state forms. In response to the tendencies to involuntary 
unemployment, economic insecurity, and economic crises in modern 
capitalism, Hegel advocates a strong competition state, capable of 
fostering economic development in new dynamic sectors of the domestic 
market and in domestic firms promising to be successful in foreign markets 
(Hegel 2008, p. 217/§236). In response to these tendencies and the severe 
inequality and poverty markets tend to generate Hegel calls for a social 
state ensuring the well‑being of all individuals is met to the greatest 
feasible extent (Ibid., p. 220/§242). A successful competition state requires 
extensive public investments in infrastructure, as well as extensive support 
for a national innovation system capable of generating a continuing stream 
of commercializable innovations (basic research, long‑term R&D, support 
for start‑ups, procurement of high‑tech products, etc.) and taxation policies 
encouraging high levels of private investment. An adequate social state 
ensuring that all citizens have access to the material preconditions for 
human flourishing also demands considerable state funding, along with 
an aggressively redistributive tax scheme. The relationship between the 
competition state and the social state is asymmetrical: the availability 
of the funds required by the social state presupposes the success of the 
competition state in fostering social wealth in the national economy. 
There may be moments – golden ages of capitalist development – when 
particular regions enjoyed considerable competitive advantages in the 
world market and were so confident of maintaining them that ample funds 
were made available for the tasks of the social state. But in a world market 
subject to the valorization imperative that situation necessarily tends to be 
temporary. Eventually a trade‑off must be made between the demands of 
the competition state Hegel endorses in the Philosophy of Right and the 
requirement of the social state he also calls for. In the face of competitive 
pressures and the constant threat of an investment strike, societies under 
the reign of capital necessarily tend to grant priority to state spending and 
tax policies fostering profit interests (Kalecki 1971). As long as the national 
economy remains a subordinate moment within the capitalist world market, 
the social state can at most be incorporated as a subordinate moment of the 
27Marx’s Hegelian Critique of Hegel
competitive state, falling short of the extensive scope called for by Hegel.
Uneven Development in the World Market
Even a subordinate form of social state cannot be generalized on the 
level of the interstate system, due to the systematic tendency towards 
uneven development in the capitalist world market. Establishing and 
maintaining an effective national innovation system is very expensive. 
Wealthy regions are able to afford the costs of the innovation necessary 
for success in the world market. Poor regions, in contrast, are trapped in 
a vicious circle: the inability to fund innovations today undermines the 
attempt to obtain the wealth to fund innovations tomorrow. Only a handful 
of countries have broken out of this vicious circle in recent centuries, 
thanks to contingencies that cannot be generalized. The “rules of the game” 
enable wealthy regions to reproduce and exacerbate their advantages over 
time, making the persistence of severe global inequality and poverty an 
essential determination of global capitalism, ruling out the universalization 
of the social state across the globe (Smith 2005, Chapter 5). 
A New Moment in World History 
In absolute terms, as just noted, only a handful of regions across the 
globe have been able to establish effective national innovation systems. In 
relative terms, however, an unprecedented number now operate. In 2016 
the U.S. share of total global R&D funding was 26.4%. Europe funded 
another one fifth of total global R&D. Asia’s share reached 41.8%, with 
China accounting for 20.4% (R&D Magazine 2016, p. 3). 
The proliferation of national innovation systems is a positive 
development as far as the rates of innovation and diffusion are concerned. 
But those are use‑value considerations, and in capitalism monetary value is 
what matters. More precisely, what matters is not innovation per se, but the 
period of time high profits can be won from a competitive advantage due 
to innovation. From this standpoint the proliferation of effective national 
innovation systems presents a major problem for capitalism. As soon as an 
innovation showing promise of being exceptionally profitable is developed 
in one region of the world, national innovation systems across the global 
are mobilized more or less immediately, hoping to get a piece of the action. 
As a result, the time prior to the outbreak of the significant overproduction 
problems Hegel discussed necessarily tends to be significantly compressed, 
as well as the time high profits can be won from a competitive advantage 
from an innovation. 
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In response, intellectual property rights have been extended in scope 
and enforcement, enabling a handful of firms to leverage publicly funded 
R&D into immense private gains. Waged work has become increasingly 
precarious, surveilled, and intensified, with labor’s share of GDP declining 
across the globe. Increasing amounts of credit have been created to stave off 
a global depression. More working households have fallen into deeper debt. 
More credit has funded purchases of financial assets, generating financial 
bubbles and financial crises. Political irrationalities have proliferated as 
cynical and opportunistic political leaders (mis)direct blame and fear to 
the marginalized “other.” Geopolitical dangers have escalated as powerful 
states see militarization as a way to prop up favored capitals and shift the 
costs of a stagnant world economy to other regions (Smith 2017). 
Our consciousness lags behind this new historical situation. We still think 
a new “golden age” would be possible if only the right sort of public policies 
could be put in place. No more “golden ages” of capitalist development 
are likely. Capitalism has reached its historical limits not because there is 
too little innovation, but because there is too much, creating problems for a 
profit-driven system. To think that a social state could tame the pathologies 
of capitalism in these circumstances is to hold fast to an abstract ought, 
analogous to holding that the pathologies of slavery or feudalism ought to 
be overcome even as those social forms remain in place. 
5. Conclusion
Hegel’s commitment to substantial freedom was deep and unequivocal, 
as was his insistence that individual freedom for social beings like us can 
only be fulfilled in a free society:
The right of individuals to be subjectively determined as free is fulfilled 
when they belong to an actual ethical order, because their certainty of 
their freedom finds its truth in such an objective order, and it is in an 
ethical order that they are actually in possession of their own essence or 
their own inner universality (Hegel 2008, p. 160/§153).
Marx echoes Hegel’s deep commitment to freedom when he calls for a 
society in which “the full and free development of every individual forms 
the ruling principle” (Marx 1976, p. 739). And he echoes the Hegelian 
claim that individual freedom for social beings can only be adequately 
found in a free social order when he asserts that “the free development of 
each is the condition for the free development of all” (Marx and Engels 
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1976, p. 506). If there is a profound disagreement between Hegel and 
Marx, it does not primarily lie on the level of normative principles. It lies 
in the fact that Marx recognized the sense in which capital is the dominant 
“subject” and “self‑moving substance” of our era, and Hegel did not. 
If we could imagine that Hegel somehow did have an adequate 
concept of capital, we can confidently predict he would have criticized 
it as vehemently as he rejected other forms of abstract universality that 
have dominated human societies in the course of history. He would have 
acknowledged that a political order where the insane imperative “M must 
become M’!” has objective priority over the political community necessarily 
rules out a social order where universality, particularity, and individuality 
are objectively reconciled in the way expressed in the system of syllogisms 
summarized in the passage at the conclusion of section 1. To comprehend 
Marx’s concept of capital is to comprehend why a capitalist market society 
cannot be a rational social order warranting rational affirmation, and why 
the modern capitalist state cannot be a “concrete universal.” 
Where do we go from here? There are places in Marx’s early writings 
where he advocates creating a form of communism reduces the complex 
dialectic of society and individual to simple and unmediated relationships 
among individuals spontaneously co‑operating in harmony. Hegel teaches 
us that such a lack of institutional mediation is quite impossible in a 
complex modern society. Any attempt to institute it would be dangerous 
as well, leading to chaos that would likely make an authoritarian rule 
promising to restore order an attractive option. 
In his later discussion of the Paris Commune in “The Civil War in 
France,” however, Marx assumes there will be recurrent and significant 
disagreements in a post‑capitalist society, requiring mediation within 
institutionalized sites of democratic discussion and decision‑making. 
He affirms that all mature individuals have a right to participate in 
decisions affecting them directly or indirectly, in both workplaces and 
local communities, including rights to freely present one’s own particular 
views and the reasons behind them, and to examine critically the views 
of others. Since decisions made by communes in particular workplaces 
and local communities have repercussions on those elsewhere, Marx also 
endorses higher‑order (more universal) deliberation and decision‑making 
representative bodies, with all representatives elected, subject to recall, 
and paid only average workers’ wages (Marx 1986b). 
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Marx’s very compressed sketch of radical deliberative democracy is 
undoubtedly inadequate as it stands.8 Nonetheless, it establishes that Marx 
shares Hegel’s commitment to a strong civic republicanism, albeit with 
one important difference. Marx extends the scope of civic republicanism to 
all exercises of public power, including authority exercised in workplaces 
and in the allocation of the social surplus. The project of struggling for this 
democratic form of socialism can be defended on good Hegelian grounds: 
a democratic form of socialism would mediate universality, particularity, 
and individuality within a political community in the manner Hegel 
rightly saw as defining a rational social order. This cannot be said of any 
community subject to the abstract universal that is capital. 
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ABSTRACT
Hegel conceptualized the capitalist economy as a system of needs, with 
commodities and money serving as means to human ends. While anticipating 
Marx’s criticisms of certain tendencies in capitalism, Hegel insisted that 
higher‑order institutions, especially those of the modern state, could put them out 
of play and establish a reconciliation of universality, particularity, and individuality 
warranting rational affirmation. Hegel, however, failed to comprehend the 
emergence of capital as a dominant subject, subordinating human ends under 
its end (“valorization”). The structural coercion, domination, and exploitation 
inherent in the capital/wage labor relationship illustrate that point, as does the 
depoliticization of inherently political matters in capitalist market societies. The 
reconciliation of universality, particularity, and individuality Hegel endorsed 
requires a form of socialism incorporating deliberative democracy in local 
workplaces and communities, conjoined with representative bodies on regional, 
national, and ultimately global levels. 
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RESUMO
Hegel concebeu a economia capitalista como um sistema de necessidades, 
onde as mercadorias e o dinheiro servem de meio para a obtenção de fins humanos. 
Antecipando as críticas de Marx a algumas tendências do capitalismo, Hegel 
insistiu no facto de um conjunto instituições de ordem superior – especialmente as 
instituições do Estado moderno – poder contrariar essas tendências e levar a uma 
reconciliação racional entre o universal, o particular e o individual. Contudo, Hegel 
não compreendeu a emergência do capital como sujeito dominante, que subordina 
os fins humanos ao seu próprio fim (“valorização”). A coerção estrutural, a 
dominação e a exploração inerentes à relação capital/trabalho assalariado ilustram 
este ponto, bem como a despolitização, nas sociedades de mercado capitalistas, de 
elementos intrinsecamente políticos. A reconciliação entre o universal, o particular 
e o individual defendida por Hegel requer uma forma de socialismo que incorpore 
a democracia deliberativa nos locais de trabalho e nas comunidades locais, em 
articulação com corpos representativos de alcance regional, nacional e, em última 
instância, global. 
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